Twenty campesinos massacred in Rigores, Honduras
A normal day in Honduras, made possible by the U.S., with full complicity of the “liberal democracies of the west”
“Violence should not be understood as an external factor added to the conflict, but rather as one of the ways in which territorial order is established, contested, and enforced.
“Homicides, disappearances, threats, displacements, and violent evictions are not exceptional occurrences, but rather manifestations of an unequal agrarian structure, sustained by weak institutions, inadequate investigations, and persistent impunity.
“Violence is not an accident, but rather a recurring mechanism of territorial regulation and social discipline.”
(Lucía Vijil)
In late November 2025, the U.S. stomped on Honduras’ electoral process, bringing back to power the same corrupt, repressive elites who had been in power from 2009-2022, after the U.S. and Canadian-backed military coup in June 2009 ousted the government of President Mel Zelaya. On December 3, 2025, we wrote:
Direct U.S. intervention in Honduran elections! Ho hum. Pardoning former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez (JOH), in jail for life for operating a drug smuggling cartel from the President’s office! Ho hum.
That these illegal and malicious U.S. interventions in Honduras are received with a deafening complicit silence by key U.S. allies: Canada, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, etc., … ho hum.
Anyone who has followed our work in Honduras since 1998, … will understand how destructive all this is, and why life will likely worsen for a majority of the population.
And so it came to pass - life worsened for the majority population.
On May 21, twenty campesinos were massacred in Rigores, in the African palm producing region of Lower Aguan. Ho hum! The U.S. and Western “liberal democracies” maintain full political, economic and military relations with the U.S. imposed government of President Asfura.
The Rigores Massacre: Violence, Land, and Impunity in the Lower Aguán
May 25, 20216, by Lucía Vijil
(Translation by Rights Action)
https://cespad.org.hn/analisis-semanal-la-masacre-de-rigores-violencia-tierra-e-impunidad-en-el-bajo-aguan/
The massacre of 20 people that took place in the community of Rigores, municipality of Trujillo, Colón Department, on May 21, 2026 [1], compels us to revisit a fundamental question: Through what lens should we analyze this type of violence?
The answer cannot be reduced to a narrow, isolated interpretation or an exclusive law enforcement-based approach. What has happened is part of a long history of land conflicts, disputes over control of the territory, militarization, the criminalization of the rural population, and persistent impunity.
This analysis aims to use to explain the facts without separating them from their context. The massacre in Rigores not only exacerbates the security crisis in the Aguán region, but also reignites a deeper dispute over the political significance of the territory, the legitimacy of the rural population, and the type of State response considered acceptable in the face of violence.
Historical Background of the Agrarian Conflict
The land conflict in the Lower Aguán region must be viewed within the broader context of land concentration, the restructuring of rural economies, and disputes over territorial control [2].
The literature on land grabbing has shown that these conflicts do not arise solely from disputes over property, but from historical cycles in which economic accumulation by business and agro-industrial groups displace rural populations and subject their ways of life to corporate logic and territorial control [3].
In the case of the Aguán, this dynamic took on a particularly acute form and has been described by scholars as the epicenter of the agrarian counter-reform [4]. In this region, the land issue gradually became intertwined with agro-industrial expansion, militarization, impunity for the murders of farmers, and the State’s inability to resolve disputes over land and residency rights.
Thus, violence should not be understood as an external factor added to the conflict, but rather as one of the ways in which territorial order is established, contested, and enforced [5].
From this perspective, the concept of structural violence proves particularly useful. It helps us understand that homicides, disappearances, threats, displacements, and violent evictions are not exceptional occurrences, but rather concentrated manifestations of an unequal agrarian structure, sustained by weak institutions, inadequate investigations, and persistent impunity.
Violence, then, according to scholars such as Galtung, is not an accident, but rather a recurring mechanism of territorial regulation and social discipline [6].
The organizational history of the Lower Aguán region confirms this interpretation.
The Rigores Campesino Movement (comprising the cooperatives: 23 de Mayo, San José, Liberación, Unidos Somos Todos, Nueva Visión, and Nuevo Despertar) emerged in 2001 at a time marked by reports of armed attacks, the presence of private security companies, and intense pressure against farming settlements and cooperatives.
In this context, the disappearance of Francisco Pascual López in 2011 became an emblematic case illustrating the forms of violence in the region: a farmer disappeared following an attack attributed to private security forces, a crime scene that was poorly processed, evidence that was overlooked, and a government investigation unable to deliver truth and justice [7].
The significance of this incident lies not only in its gravity, but also in the fact that it encapsulates a historical pattern of targeted violence, impunity, and lack of protection that has not been mitigated over time [8].
More than a decade later, Plataforma Agraria—an alliance of the peasant sector in Honduras—has revisited and reiterated many of these allegations on a different organizational scale and within a new political context. Their statements in recent years [9] have documented shootings targeting farming families, forced displacements, armed groups operating on land worked by farmers or on adjacent plots [10], violent evictions, and the murders of agricultural leaders.
The key point is that this new phase did not resolve the original land issue, but rather complicated it by layering old agrarian inequalities with new patterns of organized violence [11].
What is at stake in the Aguan region is not merely the physical ownership of certain properties, but the ability to determine who can live, produce, organize, and be recognized as a legitimate actor within the regional land and political order [12].
The Battle for the Narrative in Areas of Violence
In regions marked by violence, and particularly in the wake of a massacre such as the one that occurred in the Rigores area, the battle for the narrative becomes a central dimension of the conflict.
Labeling an event as an “agricultural conflict,” “criminal violence,” “land invasion,” or “clash between criminal groups” is not merely a matter of terminology; each of these narratives sets the boundaries of the analysis, assigns responsibility, defines who is considered a legitimate victim, and shapes the type of institutional response that will be implemented.
As soon as news of the murders broke, a battle to establish the interpretation and hypothesis of the events began. The first official statements by the National Police assigned to Trujillo attempted to remove the incident from the context of the land conflict, reframing it within the logic of criminal violence [13].
Corporate discourse reinforced this same line by placing the notion of invasion at the center of the debate and framing the violence as a problem of insecurity that threatened investment, employment, and private property [14].
Given these statements, it would seem that the only recognizable form of legitimacy is that of formal and private property, while the historical and political significance of peasant movements—including their efforts at organization, agrarian reform, settlement, and land recovery—is stripped away.
Likewise, communities settled on the large plantations are generally portrayed as criminals and instigators of violence and chaos, blurring any distinction between rural farming groups and criminal gangs.
Plataforma Agraria was quick to question the tone of the official statements and denounced the risk that the communities would be made scapegoats for the Rigores massacre, even before a serious investigation had begun [15].
This is not the first time a violent incident has been used to reinforce the idea that land recoveries are natural hotbeds of criminality. In contrast, the subsequent statement by the Society of Jesus (Jesuits in Honduras) [16] succeeded in reframing the incident within the context of land conflict, militarization, organized violence, and the existence of illegal armed groups.
Security Minister Gerson Velásquez [17] surprised many with his statements, asserting that the massacre was the result of a settling of scores and killings between organized criminal groups, and ruling out any direct link between the tragic event and the long-standing land conflicts in the area.
These statements highlight a structural issue in the Lower Aguán: the criminal pressure that operates in a region with a pre-existing agrarian conflict, and operates directly on the campesinos who work the land.
Some interpretive keys
The Rigores massacre must be understood as a critical juncture because it encapsulates several dimensions of the land conflict in the Aguán Valley and forces the government to decide how it will interpret the violence going forward.
It also raises an unavoidable question: how will a solution be sought for the various aspects of the conflict?
On one hand, the Rigores massacre confirms the persistence of unresolved territorial conflicts, where land disputes continue to result in deadly situations for rural communities. On the other hand, it shows that these conflicts can no longer be understood without considering the presence of illegal armed groups, criminal networks, and drug trafficking organizations that operate across the region and are involved in land disputes.
This dual dimension compels us to avoid reducing the conflict to: i) categorizing the entire problem as organized crime, thereby erasing the agrarian history of the conflict and the historical context of the campesino’s demands, and ii) discussing the struggle for land as if the territory were not currently affected by illegal economies, armed groups, and networks of coercion that exacerbate the community’s vulnerability.
The situation that has unfolded since May 21, 2026, requires us to examine both dimensions simultaneously in order to analyze how they interact, how the State has failed to fulfill its role for years, how the National Police has been complicit in the harassment of rural groups, how criminal networks have remained intact, and how effective justice can be ensured.
Demands from citizens and institutions that emerged in the wake of the massacre have not been limited to calling for punishment for the perpetrators; rather, they have opened up a discussion about the structural conditions that make the recurrence of violence possible. The issue is thus no longer just about who fired the shots, but also about who permitted, tolerated, or managed a territorial order in which events of this magnitude can occur.
The current situation also presents an opportunity to critically assess the government’s response.
If the National Police stationed in the area continue to frame the situation as an “invasion” and a crime problem, the most likely outcome will be an intensification of strategies of militarization, repression, and territorial control.
If, however, it is acknowledged (as social sectors and civil society are doing) that the massacre is part of a land conflict marked by impunity and organized violence, the response should focus on independent investigations, community protection, regulation of private security, the dismantling of illegal armed groups, and the establishment of effective mechanisms for resolving land disputes.
This is where the idea of democratic conflict management comes into play—an approach that CESPAD has strongly promoted. It is argued, then, that in a context where peasant communities have historically been positioned as the most vulnerable link in the agricultural structure and the regime of violence, a democratic response can only be legitimate if it seeks to protect their lives, recognize their demands, guarantee their participation, and dismantle all forms of criminalization that turn them, almost automatically, into collective suspects.
In this context, democratic governance entails considering the following courses of action:
First: a serious, independent, and thorough investigation of the massacre, capable of establishing both direct and indirect responsibilities.
Second: the dismantling of illegal armed groups—criminal gangs—and the protection networks that enable them to operate.
Third: a critical review of the role of private security and forms of territorial militarization that exacerbate the conflict rather than resolving it.
Fourth: the creation of mechanisms for agricultural negotiation with guarantees of compliance and the effective participation of farmer organizations.
Fifth: a comprehensive policy of protection and reparations for communities living under constant threat.
The Rigores massacre is neither a marginal incident nor a mere isolated outbreak of local violence, as if it were a recent phenomenon. It is an event that highlights, underscores, and continues to bring to light the urgent need for comprehensive government responses to land conflicts.
[1] For more information: https://www.infobae.com/honduras/2026/05/22/honduras-confirma-20-muertos-tras-masacre-en-trujillo-colon-entre-victimas-hay-mujeres-y-menores/
[2] CESPAD. Agrarian Conflict in the Aguán: Structural Causes, Characteristics of the Social Dispute, and a New Approach for a Democratic Solution. September 2023. Available at: https://cespad.org.hn/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Conflicto-Agrario-en-el-Aguan-WEB-1_compressed.pdf
[3] Borras Jr., S. M., & Franco, J. C. (2013). Cycles of land grabbing in Central America: An argument for history and a case study in the Bajo Aguán, Honduras. Third World Quarterly, 34(9), 1697–1722.
[4] Macías, M. 2010. The Capital of the Agrarian Counter-Reform: the Bajo Aguán
[5] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (2016). Violence, Inequality, and Impunity in Honduras. Organization of American States. https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/multimedia/2016/honduras/honduras.html
[6] Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and research for peace. Journal of Peace Research, 6 (3), 167–191.
[7] More information: https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/2022/HNAD_1881-14_ES.PDF
[8] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (2016). Violence, Inequality, and Impunity in Honduras. Organization of American States.
[9] More information on the Plataforma Agraria Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/PlataformaAgrariaHn
[10] For example, the Quebrada de Arena criminal gang “Los Cachos” targeting farmer cooperatives such as Chile and Tranvío; or, in the case of Rigores, the criminal gang “Los Harold” targeting the Gregorio Chávez Company and the Rigores Farmers’ Movement.
[11] Reuters. (n.d.). How a bloody territorial dispute in Honduras is driving migration to the United States https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/honduras-migration-land/
[12] Borras Jr., S. M., & Franco, J. C. (2013). Cycles of land grabbing in Central America: An argument for history and a case study in the Bajo Aguán, Honduras. Third World Quarterly, 34(9), 1697–1722.
[13] More information: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/17KYPaeTH4/
[14] Statements by the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP): https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BkkAAShdw/
[15] More information: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/14kWaXMHTtn/
[16] More information: https://x.com/jesuitascam/status/2057925316673183949?s=20
[17] More information: https://www.instagram.com/reel/DYn0XGnBFGd/
Recent background
Help stop Global Food Industry violence in Bajo Aguan, Honduras
Rights Action, February 4, 2025
https://mailchi.mp/rightsaction/help-stop-global-food-industry-violence-in-bajo-aguan-honduras
The palm oil company Corporación DINANT, owned by the notorious Honduran Facussé family, is behind the escalation. DINANT is known for its violent expansion in the Agúan Valley, and are business partners with the who’s who of the global ag-industry (food for export production) based in the USA, Switzerland, England, Holland, Singapore, etc.
DINANT Corporation’s business partners
Nestle Food Company (Switzerland)
Mondelez International Inc. snack foods (USA)
PepsiCo food, snack and beverages (USA)
Archer Daniels Midland food processing (USA)
Bunge Global agribusiness and food (Switzerland)
Cargill Inc. food corp. (USA)
Flora Food Group BV (Holland)
Friesland-Campina N.V. dairy (Holland)
Olenex/Wilmar palm oil (joint venture of ADM and Wilmar Int’l (Singapore)
Vandemoortele Worcester (England)